NOTES
TE AVAILABILITY AND REVIEWABILITY OF

PRULINGS OF TEE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE
The tax effects of a man's economic behavior are a determinant of his
actions both in choosing among alternatives and in deciding whether or
not to proceed with a pending transaction. Yet, the Internal Revenue
Code is so complex and comprehensive that it is often impossible for tax
counsel, let alone laymen, to predict the tax consequences of transactions.
The uncertainty engendered by these business facts of life represents a
disruptive factor in economic planning and, occasionally, can cause the total
abandonment of the proposed transaction. But given the vast number of
contemplated transactions for which tax factors are material or pivotal,
formal court procedures for providing the necessary certainty in advance
would prove burdensome.
I.

THE AVAILABILITY OF RULINGS

The Internal Revenue Service has evolved a program which gives
to individual taxpayers valuable guidance as to the tax consequences of

their proposed transactions. Though many administrative agencies offer
pretransaction guidance,' in no other agency has this function assumed
such major proportions, in terms of time and staff, 2 or come to be relied
IFor a symposium on informal public guidance procedures of the FTC, SEC,
ICC, CAB, FCC, FPC, and the Department of Agriculture see Assistance Available
to the Public From Governmental Agencies, 11 AD. L. BuLl. 72 (1958). See generally
HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 89 (1952); Vogeler, Declaratory Rulings in

Administrative Agencies, 31 Ky. L.J. 20 (1942).
2The Tax Rulings Division is functionally divided into ten branches with a
staff as of May 1, 1964, of 428 allocated as follows:
ORGANIZATION

STRENGTH

15
Actuarial and Insurance Tax Branch
66
Corporation Tax Branch
24
Employment Tax Branch
19
Estate and Gift Tax Branch
94
Exempt Organizations Branch
54
Excise Tax Branch
64
Individual Income Tax Branch
32
Pension Trust Branch
40
Reorganization Branch
20
Tax Rulings Division-General
Letter From John W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, to the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, May 1, 1964, on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School. In fiscal year 1963 the Division disposed
of 34,967 requests for rulings from taxpayers. 1963 IRS ANN. REP. 6. The Division
participated in 11,350 formal and informal conferences with taxpayers in regard to
these requests. Ibid.
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upon by the public to such an extent as the Internal Revenue Service's
rulings program 3 Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is the
tax collector, the one who institutes tax litigation, and the taxpayer's
adversary in such litigation, it is natural that taxpayers will strive to obtain
his advance stamp of approval. It is therefore understandable that the
rulings program, in the words of the Service, "has a very broad impact on
our national economy and on proper and reasonable tax administration." 4
Enhancing the impact of advance rulings is the Commissioner's policy of
considering himself bound by his rulings 5 even though they may not be
legally binding. 6
A. Evolution of the Present Program

The procedural framework in which the rulings program operates, as
well as the areas in which he will issue advance rulings, is formulated by
the Commissioner and published in the form of Revenue Procedures. There
is no formal limitation upon his discretion in establishing procedures, since
section 7805 (a) of the Code broadly authorizes the Commissioner to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title,
including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any
alteration of law in relation to internal revenue." 7 Within this broad
authorization, periodic changes in the procedures have occurred, repreSee Technical Information Release 610, 7 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
16670 (July 9, 1964) [hereinafter cited as T.I.R. 610]; Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings

Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, N.Y.U. 20Mr
INST. oN FED. TAX. 1 (1962); Clark, Practical Considerationsin Obtaining Rulings
and in Filing Claims for Refund, TULANE 6THi INSTITUTE ON FED. TAxATIONr 257
(1957); Redman, New Procedures Re Letter Rulings; Request for Washington
Assistance, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAx. INsT. 411; Sugarman, Federal Tax Rulings Procedure, 10 TAx L. REV. 1 (1954) ; Wenchel, Taxpayer's Rulings, 5 TAX L. REV. 105
(1950) ; Yager, When and How Should the PractitionerAsk for Rulings and Technical Advice?, 14 J. TAXATION 38 (1961). But see Lore, Revision of Ruling Procedures Now Issued; "No Ruling" Areas Outlined, 18 J. TAxATION 114 (1963):
"There are, of course, some who feel that it would be better to have no rulings at all,
in which case action would be predicated solely upon advice of counsel. True, this
would involve more litigation, but the court decisions might furnish greater latitude
than that which currently exists as reflected by the ruling policy of the Service."
4 T.I.R. 610.

Proc. 62-28, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 496, 505:
Except in rare or unusual circumstances, the revocation or modification

5 Rev.

of a ruling will not be applied retroactively with respect to the taxpayer to
whom the ruling was originally issued or to a taxpayer whose tax liability
was directly involved in such ruling if (1) there has been no misstatement or
omission of material facts, (2) the facts subsequently developed are not
materially different from the facts on which the ruling was based, (3) there
has been no change in the applicable law, (4) the ruling was originally issued
with respect to a prospective or proposed transaction, and (5) the taxpayer
directly involved in the ruling acted in good faith in reliance upon the ruling

and the retroactive revocation would be to his detriment
6 See DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAw TREATISE § 4.09, at 267 (1958).
7 INT. REV. CoDE or 1954, § 7805 (a) [hereinafter all sections cited refer to
REv. CODE OF 1954 unless otherwise indicated] ; see Caplin, supra note 3, at 7.
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senting a continuing effort to reconcile the needs of taxpayers with the
administrative burdens imposed by this program.
In 1913 the Commissioner honored all requests for rulings upon
8
prospective transactions but did not purport to be bound by them. As the
volume of rulings increased, the Commissioner found it necessary to limit
advance rulings to transactions for which prior approval of the Commissioner was a statutory requisite of nontaxability. The resultant clamor
for advance guidance testified to the importance of advance rulings to
taxpayers, 10 and Congress responded by passing a statute in 1938 providing
for the "closing agreement." 11 This device was a formal contractual arrangement under which the Commissioner promised to tax the transaction
in an agreed manner, and the taxpayer promised that the facts would not
change. What Congress did not foresee was that a rulings procedure
involving pending transactions must be expeditious and devoid of cumbersome formalities to be useful to taxpayers.' 2 Though now a seldom-used
fossil,' 3 the closing agreement at least represents a public and legislative
recognition of the necessity of advance guidance.
In 1940, after the insufficiency of the closing agreement became apparent, the Commissioner responded to this need by eliminating the "red
tape" and issuing informal rulings. 14 The Commissioner published in 1953
his policy of ruling upon prospective transactions 15 and in 1959 his policy
of considering himself bound by them,16 thereby- rendering explicit what
had obtained in practice.
B. The Function of the No-Ruling List

Ideally, the taxpayer would desire an advance assurance as to the tax
consequences of all his transactions. The Commissioner, however, must
balance the need for rulings with such administrative practicalities as the
availability of staff. Until 1960 it was uncertain whether the Commissioner
would act upon any given request. To provide some certainty the Commissioner published a list of both general and specific areas in which he
8Id. at 2-3.
9 G.C.M. 2228, 1 Cum. BULL. 310 (1919).
10 See Oliphant, DeclaratoryRulings, 24 A.B.A.J. 7 (1938) ; Traynor, Declaratory
Rulings, 16 TAXES 195 (1938).
11 IT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7121.
12 See Caplin, supra note 3, at 4-5; Taylor, Tax Rulings: New Rules and Procedures, N.Y.U. 21sT INST. ON FED. TAx. 69, 72 (1963).
13 For fiscal year 1963, there were two requests made for closing agreements, and
two such agreements were consummated. 1963 IRS ANN. REP. 7.
14 Attorney Gen. Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure
in Government Agencies, Administration of Internal Revenue Laws, S. Doc. No. 10,

pt. 9, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 n.126 (1941)

[hereinafter cited without title]; Caplin,

supra note 3, at 3.
1

5Rev. Rul. 53-10, 1953-1 Cum. Burr. 488.
16 Rev. Rul. 54-172, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 394, 400.
note 3, at 7.

See generally Caplin, supra
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17
Revised
either would always refuse or ordinarily would refuse to rule.
number
the
lists have been published in 1962 18 and 1964,19 each diminishing
20
of no-ruling areas to some extent
Despite the incidental benefit that may have accrued to the taxpayer
by the enlargement of the areas in which rulings will be given, the primary
purpose of the no-ruling list has remained one of saving taxpayers the time
2
and expense of preparing a ruling request in the listed areas. ' This
suggests that the list is regarded more as a convenience for taxpayers than
as an articulation of the Commissioner's policies offered for public scrutiny
and censure.
Interviews with several members of the Philadelphia tax bar revealed
a gratitude for the service rendered by the Commissioner through his
rulings program, and a reluctance to advocate the need for reassessment
of the philosophy thereof.2 2 This attitude may be attributable to a reluctance to "rock the boat." It was nonetheless admitted that a refusal
to rule has a discouraging effect upon a prospective transaction. A stock
phrase used by tax counsel in substantial transactions is: "subject to
favorable rulings of the Internal Revenue Service." 2

C. The Effect of a Refusal To Rule-the Warwick Fund
Two recent and related refusals to rule, involving an investment "swap
fund," offer an opportunity to examine the effects of such a refusal upon
a prospective transaction which has potentially significant tax consequences.
A "swap fund" is a mutual fund whereby investors receive shares of
in exchange for their own appreciated shares of stock, thereby
fund
the
If this exchange is a
and expert management.2
diversification
gaining
capital gain
constitutes
shares
the
member's
in
appreciation
the
one,
taxable
25
that
provides
351
section
however
fund;
the
to
transfer
upon
recognizable
if
nontaxable
is
thereof
stock
for
a
corporation
to
"property"
transfers of
17

Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 880.

The Tax Rulings Division indicates that "ordinarily will not" means almost
never. Interview With Harold T. Swartz, Assistant Commissioner-Technical, and
John W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, in Washington, D.C.,

March 5, 1964.

Is Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 527.
39 Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 14.
20 See generally Caplin, supra note 3, at 6-11; 21 J. TAXATION 156 (1964).
21 Letter From John W. S. Littleton to University of Pennsylvania Law Review,

May 1, 1964, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
stating this to be the "basic philosophy" of the no-ruling list.
22
Interviews With Members of the Philadelphia Tax Bar, in Philadelphia, Feb.April 1964.
23
Redman, supra note 3, at 411.
24
ATION
2

See Warwick Fund Riding Withdrawn; IRS Policy Questioned, 19 J. TAx-

197, 198 (1963) [hereinafter cited without title].
INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 1221-22.
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the transferors are thereafter in control of the transferee corporation.28
The first attempts to establish such a fund utilized a corporate form, the
most famous being the Centennial Fund, which elicited a favorable tax
ruling, under section 351, from the Commissioner. But the Commissioner
decided to reconsider his position and established a moratorium on all
corporate swap fund rulings, and subsequently announced his refusal to
rule.2 7 The risk of taxability and the likelihood of litigation discouraged
the use of the corporate form and caused investment promoters to seek
an alternative. 28
As to Centennial, the cause of the Commissioner's uncertainty might
have been that the intent of Congress in allowing tax-free corporate organization under section 351 was arguably to favor the operations of a distinct
going concern. It is arguable that Centennial was a mere pooling of assets
rather than a commencing of operations by a distinct corporation. To
avoid the section 351 problems the Warwick fund planned to organize in
partnership form, since transfer of appreciated assets to a partnership
would be nontaxable.2 Again, the Commissioner first ruled favorably, but
upon reconsideration revoked the ruling and published his refusal to rule
upon this type of transaction.3 ° The tax counsel for the Warwick Fund
stated that the effect of this refusal to rule was the demise of the fund
before it was even introduced to the public. 3 ' A major reason would
appear to have been the contemplated difficulty of convincing a sufficient
number of individuals holding highly appreciated stocks to subscribe without the final assurance of the Commissioner that this would not be a taxable
exchange.
Although various reasons have been advanced by tax counsel and
scholars for the Commissioner's refusal to rule in the Warwick Fund
situation,32 the Tax Rulings Division marks the swap fund area as one of
genuine uncertainty upon which it is premature to formulate a concrete
position.3 3 The Division further indicates that the question of whether a
2

61NT. REv. CODE op 1954, § 351.
27 See Redman, supra note 3, at 440-41.
28
See 19 J. TAXATIOx 197 (1963).
29 INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 721; see 19 1. TAXATIONT 197, 198 (1963).

-OSee ibid. The refusal to rule isstated inthe most recent list to be applicable
to the issue of "classification of a newly organized unincorporated investment organization as a trust, partnership, or an association taxable as a corporation, where there
is a transfer of appreciated stocks or securities in exchange for an interest therein,
as a result of solicitation by promoters, brokers or investment houses." Rev. Proc.
64-31, 1964 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 30, at 17.
31 Interviews With Raymond J. Bradley and Jerome Kurtz of the Philadelphia
Tax3Bar, in Philadelphia, Feb. 28, 1964.
2 Reasons offered range from the Commissioner's not wanting to grant Warwick
a competitive advantage over those who would still form a corporate swap fund to
the ruling request having been channeled through the Individual Branch of the Tax
Rulings Division which was not thought to be as familiar as the Corporations Branch
with problems of a corporate nature. One writer accused the Commissioner of harboring basic hostilities toward the swap fund device. 19 J. TAXATION 197, 198 (1963).
3 interview With Harold T. Swartz, Assistant Commissioner-Technical, and
John W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, in Washington, D.C.,
March 5, 1964.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

86

[Vol.l13:81

swap-fund partnership constitutes an association taxable as a corporation
under section 7701 falls within those matters which are "inherently
factual," 34 an established "ordinarily will not rule" area.35
Whatever the reason for the Commissioner's failure to rule, the fact
remains that proposed undertakings were permanently discouraged as a
result. These instances illustrate the power of the Commissioner to exert
an indirect control upon the form or direction of segments of the economy
by use of the no-ruling device. The Commissioner displayed an awareness
of this problem when he acknowledged that "in view of the complex tax
laws and high tax rates, it is understandable why taxpayers frequently
hesitate to move on important business transactions without some official
assurance of the tax consequences." 3 6 This effect of a refusal to rule must
represent a focal point for any meaningful appraisal of the no-ruling system.
D. The Areas of No-Ruling: An Evaluation
The list does not itself purport to explain the Commissioner's reasons for not ruling in particular areas. However, it is important that
the rulings program be grounded upon principles consistent with the Commissioner's realization of the importance of rulings and the effect of refusing
to rule.3 7

The Commissioner should not refuse to rule unless either the

nature of the question or the administrative burden render ruling unfeasible.
The present no-ruling policies of the Service will serve as a point of
departure for the development of principles consistent with the concept of
rulings being granted whenever feasible. The most recent no-ruling list,
promulgated July 27, 1964, specifies three general and eighteen specific
areas where rulings will not be issued and also two general and seven
specific areas in which rulings "ordinarily will not be issued." 38 For
purposes of analysis, there are three basic categories into which this list
can be divided: 1) where the matter is "inherently factual"; 2) where the
Commissioner's position is unsettled; 3) where the Commissioner's concept
of "sound tax administration" dictates that he not rule.
1. Areas "Inherently Factual"
Even before the publication of the no-ruling list, the Commissioner
stated his no-ruling policy to be that he would not rule "where the determination requested is primarily one of fact." 3 9 The examples which he
offered indicate what was meant by a "determination of fact":
34 Ibid.
35
Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. REv. BuL.m No. 30, at 14.
36 T.I.R. 610.
37 The Commissioner stated in T.I.R. 610 his recognition that "rulings are of
utmost importance to many taxpayers in planning their business and tax affairs,"

and that the rulings program "is a significant feature of our self-assessment [tax]
system."
38 Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 14.
39

Statement of Procedural Rules, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 947.
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(1) market value of property, (2) whether compensation is reasonable in amount, (3) whether a transfer is one in contemplation
of death, (4) whether retention of earnings and profits by a corporation is for the purpose of avoiding surtax on its shareholders,
or (5) whether a transfer or acquisition is within section 1551 or
section 269 of the Code [in which the issue is whether the purpose
of the transaction is to avoid taxation] .40

The present no-ruling list specifies additional areas whose factual nature is
the probable reason for not ruling.41 The Commissioner further states
in his most recent no-ruling procedure that rulings will not "ordinarily"
be issued "where the determination requested is primarily one of fact." 42
The law-fact dichotomy is an infamously imprecise one; a meaningful
evaluation of the no-ruling policy demands that the kinds of questions
which have been denoted as being factual be isolated and the reasons for not
ruling in each explored. These areas can be categorized according to their
location along the spectrum of feasibility.
a. Where a Material Fact May Not Become Known Until After the
Transaction Occurs
In such a case, even if there were extensive investigation to discover
all relevant facts and to verify the taxpayer's assumptions, a decision upon
the ultimate fact could not be confidently made. An example is whether
a gift is one in contemplation of death, since the estate tax consequences
depend, inter alia, upon the length of time intervening between the gift
and date of death. 43 The reason for not ruling in such a case is not an
excessive administrative cost or burden, but lack of clairvoyance."
b. Where the Issue Is One of Motive, Purpose, or Relationship
In many such cases the ultimate issue depends upon inferences drawn
from a myriad of variables, the outcome of which would turn upon a slight
change of any variable or introduction of a new one.4 5 Moreover, while all
40 Ibid.

41
E.g., whether advances to thin corporations constitute loans or equity investments (§ 163); whether "substantially all" premiums of a contract of insurance are
paid within a period of four years from the date on which the contract is purchased
(§264(b)); the amount of working capital attributable to the business or portion
of the business terminated which may be distributed in partial liquidation (§ 346);
matters relating to the validity of family partnerships where capital is not a material
income producing factor (§ 704(e)). In the "ordinarily" will not rule category are
questions of useful lives of assets and depreciation rates. Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964
INT. 42Rxv. BuLL. No. 30, at 14.
Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 18.
43
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035. The no-ruling appears in Rev. Proc. 64-31,
1964 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 30, at 17.
44 See generally Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation Under the
Laws, 26 IOWA L. Rnv. 241, 252-56 (1941).
Securities
45
E.g., questions under IN . REV. CODE OF 1954, §§269 (whether a corporate
acquisition was made to evade or avoid federal taxes), 341 (whether a corporation
will be considered to be "collapsible"), 1551 (disallowance of surtax exemption).
These are all current no-ruling or "ordinarily" will not rule areas.
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relevant facts might be extant at the time of the ruling request, it would
require extensive investigation to extricate them. This would not be of
overriding significance if the Commissioner could attach credence to the
facts as stated by the taxpayer; however, issues such as intent and relationship are particularly susceptible to coloration of the facts by the taxpayer
in his favor.
Weighing against a no-ruling policy for questions of intent in particular
is the fact that such requests often entail consequences of considerable
impact; the very establishment of a corporate enterprise or its form of
operation often hinges upon the treatment given to such a ruling request.
For example, the impact of a refusal to rule on issues such as whether the
purpose of an acquisition is to avoid taxes under section 269, or problems
of "collapsible corporations" arising under section 341 is considerable. This
impact can be compared to that which accompanies refusals to rule upon
questions of depreciation rates, valuation, or reasonable compensation. The
consequences of not ruling on the latter questions would be less likely to
alter significantly the course of the taxpayer's economic behavior.
Although the Commissioner is justified in not wanting to give an
advance stamp of approval regarding such issues as intent, it should be possible for him to rule whether, on the face of the ruling request together
with any facts learned in conference, he does find an intent to avoid taxes.
The Commissioner presently refuses to rule upon "the results of transactions which lack bona fide business purpose and have as their principal
purpose the reduction of federal taxes." 4 6 In deciding not to rule under
this general category, the Commissioner resolves an issue of intent identical
to that raised by the above proposal. The Commissioner could indicate
the elements of the proposed transaction which lead to the conclusion that
there is an intent to avoid taxes, thereby providing a basis for the taxpayer to revamp the transaction to meet the objections, or adjust his bargaining position to meet a high tax.
A practice mitigating the hardship of not ruling on questions of intent
is the Commissioner's willingness to rule as to the tax consequences flowing
from all other aspects of a transaction while issuing a caveat that the
future application of, for
favorable ruling on these aspects is subject to 47
example, section 269 to the facts as they develop.
c. Where There Is a Substantial Risk That the Facts Presented in the
Ruling Request Will Not Be Those of the Transaction if and When
Consummated
The taxpayer should not be able to test various hypothetical transactions in a quest to determine the most favorable. The transaction should
be in that state of imminence or finality that the Commissioner does not
Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. R v. BuLL. No. 30, at 17.
Interview With Harold T. Swartz, Assistant Commissioner-Technical, and
John W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, in Washington, D.C.,
46
47

March 5, 1964.
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waste his time giving legal advice in answer to "trial balloons." This policy
is furthered by the Service's demand for a complete statement of facts of
the transaction and the submitting of all documents, and by their refusal
to honor requests which contain alternative plans.48
The Commissioner's refusal to rule upon "a matter involving the
prospective application of the estate tax to the property of the estate of
a living person" 49 may also be grounded upon the volatility of the operative
facts and the indefiniteness of the time at which the taxable event will
occur. The latter factor also may have induced the addition to the 1964
list of a new "ordinarily will not rule" category: "The tax effect of any
transaction to be consummated at some indefinite future time." 50
d. Where the Ultimate Factual Issue Depends Upon Facts Subject to
Documentation or Verification Without SubstantialRisk of Change
The facts in such instances would not be the object of mere conjecture,
nor are they substantially variable. Therefore, the Commissioner can make
a determination at the time of the ruling request with as much facility as he
could upon the consummation of the transaction. For example, a stock
option could be just as easily and more accurately valued immediately prior
to the contemplated transfer of the options than upon audit of the return
for the year of transfer, since the valuation would occur closer to the taxable
event. The same also would be true of a prospective transfer of a painting
to a museum.61 If a taxpayer is contemplating the purchase of a contract
of insurance, the Commissioner should be able to rule whether or not
"substantially all premiums" will be payable within four years of purchase
within section 264(b) .52 Here, the taxpayer can submit documentary proof
of contractual payment dates and these facts can be subsequently verified
upon each year's audit by check stubs.
As problems become more complex and variable, such as issues of thin
capitalization or reasonable compensation, the more the considerations
applicable to questions in prior discussed categories will militate against
ruling in these instances. Those categories do not present clearcut lines;
in the "gray" areas each request should be subjected to analysis to determine the feasibility of ruling.
As is true of all rulings, the additional cost of ruling in the factual
areas in which it is feasible within the above analysis stems from the
necessity of investigating the transaction twice: the ultimate factual issue
must first be decided at the time of the ruling, and the facts later verified
48
Rev. Proc. 62-28, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 496, 500.
49
Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. RWv. BuLL. No. 30, at 17.
50 Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 30, at 18.
5' Former Commissioner Caplin indicated that only budget and staff factors militate against ruling in these cases. Interview With Mortimer M. Caplin, in Washington, D.C., March 5, 1964. Questions of valuation are currently in the "ordinarily"
will not rule category. Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. Rzv. BuLl. No. 30, at 18.
52 This issue is in the no-ruling category. Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. REV.
Butr. No. 30, at 15.
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upon audit of the return for the year in which the transaction occurs, to
insure that there has been no departure from those facts given in the request.
Therefore, a liberalization in ruling policy through the granting of rulings
necessitates additional manpower. This might be accomplished only by an
increase in the portion of the Service's budget allocated to rulings, or
an increase in the Service's budget by Congress.
An alternative is to charge a fee for costs of ruling on questions in the
last category. This practice would leave it to the taxpayer to decide
whether the cost involved is less than the value to him of the certainty.
Just as counsel bills his client, the Tax Rulings Division could maintain
records for hours of labor spent upon a given request. The Assistant Commissioner-Technical stated that such a proposal had been "loosely considered" but that computation of an administrable fee schedule would be
difficult and that charging a fee is contrary to the concept of the rulings
program as a public service. 3 A more administrable system would be to
charge a uniform filing fee for all ruling requests to defray the cost of
ruling in the additional areas. Most members of the tax bar interviewed
indicated a willingness to pay a fee to obtain rulings in factual areas. Such
proposals should therefore be given serious consideration if funds cannot
be obtained elsewhere.
2. Where the Commissioner's Position Is Unsettled
Falling within this category are three basic situations in which rulings
will not be issued or will be delayed: (1) where the Commissioner's prior
position has been overturned by a district court or the Tax Court, and he is
contemplating appeal; (2) where issuance of regulations is pending; (3)
where the Commissioner is otherwise uncertain as to the nature of a
proposed transaction and does not want to take a position until the effects
thereof are known, or is awaiting judicial guidance as to a difficult problem
of interpretation.
The tax bar almost unanimously agreed that the Commissioner should
not be compelled to take a stand without time for evaluation. If he were
to issue a ruling and regulations were later published embodying a different tax result, this would place others contemplating the same transaction
at a competitive advantage or disadvantage, given the Commissioner's
published policy of not revoking a ruling retroactively if the taxpayer has
changed his position. 4
However, not ruling in such situations causes considerable hardship,
since the very fact of new legislation or a reconsideration of a position is
the reason for the increased need for certainty.5 Thus the Revenue Act
53

Interview With Harold T. Swartz, Assistant Commissioner-Technical, and John

W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, in Washington, D.C., March 5,
1964.

5 supra.
5 See Redman, New Procedures Re Letter Rulings; Request for Washington
Assistance, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAx Ixisr. 411, 420-21. An example of such uncertainty
54 See note
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of 1964 will give rise to considerable uncertainty, but the Commissioner
will probably refuse to rule on these new sections as to questions which
will be resolved by regulations.
However, the issue becomes one of how much time the Commissioner
should take while prospective transactions are held in abeyance. Mitigation of the resulting hardship can be achieved only by expediting the
promulgation of regulations and eliminating undue procrastination in evaluating an uncertain issue and assuming a position. The Service has recently taken steps to insure a more rapid issuance of regulations 56 in
response to complaints by members of the tax bar of Service slothfulness
on this score.67 At the same time, four years elapsed before the Service
assumed a position and issued rulings upon the issue whether know-how
constitutes property which can be transferred tax free in exchange for stock
under section 351.58 The Service's policy in streamlining the issuance of
regulations should be extended to the achievement of shorter evaluation
periods during which rulings are refused.
3. Sound Tax Administration
The Commissioner places a general limitation upon issuance of rulings
by the statement that he will rule "whenever appropriate in the interest
of sound tax administration." Il The meaning of this phrase is indicated
by this pronouncement:
Certain plans may have tax attractiveness if a narrow reading
of the Code provision is assumed. In fact, the correct tax interpretation may be uncertain or borderline in light of the entire
legislative history. Others may appear to be designed solely, or
at least primarily, for tax avoidance purposes-or may fall into
the category of what is commonly called a "tax gimmick." In
these situations, where the correct tax result is in doubt, it does
not appear to be "wise administration" for the Service to give its
00
official blessing by issuing a favorable advance ruling.
Such policies have evoked concern, 1 since it is possible that the no-ruling
device is in this way utilized as a weapon to discourage transactions to
which the Commissioner is hostile but to which the Code attaches favorable
is that which existed as to the status under § 7701 of "professional corporations"
while the Commissioner refused rulings. See Maycock & Eaton, Professional Cor-

porations: Tax Benefits Are Not Lost in Today's New Hostile Climate, 20 J. TAXATION 150, 152 (1964).
56 See 21J. TAXATION 57, col. 1 (1964).
57 Wormser, To the Commissioner of Internal Revenue: A Plea for "Nonaggression," 20 J.TAXATION 108 (1964).
58 Cohen, Long-Awaited Riding on Transfer of Know-How Sets Guidelines in
Imnportant Areas, 21 J.TAXATION 38 (1964).
5

9Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 Cum.BuJL. 527.
Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A
inent of principles, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1, 16 (1962).
60 Caplin,

61 See Wormser, mpra note 57, at 108; 19 J.TAXATION 197, 198 (1963).
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tax consequences. Some of the tax counsel interviewed asserted that the
reason for not ruling in the Centennial and Warwick situations was that
the Commissioner thought them to be a "tax gimmick." Another issue for
which the Commissioner's refusal to rule had been criticized and his
motives questioned was whether a distributee ceases to have interest in the
corporation after a stock redemption where the spouse is the sole or
principal shareholder after redemption, under section 302(c) (2) (A) (1).
If there is no termination of interest, the payment in redemption is treated
as a dividend and not a distribution of capital. Section 302(c) (2) (A)
provides a clear exception to the section 318(a) rules which attribute a
spouse's stock to the taxpayer. The impression of tax counsel that the
Commissioner simply disagreed with the statute and that this does not
justify not ruling might have prompted the Commissioner to delete this
issue from the most recent no-ruling list.6 2
A general area in which the Commissioner refuses to rule as a matter
of sound tax administration is upon "the results of transactions which
lack bona fide business purpose and have as their principal purpose the
reduction of Federal taxes." ' There was some feeling among the members of the tax bar interviewed that the Commissioner should rule favorably
in all cases where the Code calls for a favorable tax result, and that loopholes are for Congress to close.'" But the role of the Commissioner in the
scheme of tax law interpretation must be remembered. It is apparent that
Congress would expect that the Commissioner not rule favorably in a case
where the letter of the statute might be complied with, but Congress could
not have intended a favorable tax result. But that does not mean that
he should not rule at all. If it be true that the questioned transaction does
not fall within the spirit of the Code section, he has warrant to rule
adversely. If his judgment is justified, it is difficult to believe that the
courts will demand a literal reading of the given section.
The Supreme Court has given the Commissioner grounds for ruling
adversely in the situation where there is a lack of bona fide business
5
purpose. In Knetsch v. United States, despite dictum that it is the
intent of Congress and not the motive of the taxpayer which is important,
the Court held the loan transaction a sham, "for it is patent that there was
nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this transaction beyond
a tax reduction." 66 The Court seems to be inferring that it is not the
intent of Congress to allow transactions to be favorably taxed when there
is no valid business purpose.
Compare Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 527, 529, with Rev. Proc. 64-31,
REv. BULL. No. 30, at 14-17.
63 Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. REv. BULL No. 30, at 17.
64 See Wormser, supra note 57, at 108; cf. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S.
361, 370 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
65 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
62

1964

INT.

66

Id. at 366.
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Therefore, if the Commissioner's refusal to rule stems from a doubt
that the transaction is one to which Congress intended to attach favorable
consequences, it seems reasonable to expect him to rule adversely, 67 and to
not utilize the no-ruling device as an indirect weapon for discouraging it.
If, on the other hand, there are no grounds for wariness, and it is clear
that Congress has expressed its will on the subject-which was true of the
302 redemption of stock-refusing to rule is indefensible.
E. Revenue Procedure 64-31
The latest no-ruling list, embodied in Revenue Procedure 64-31,6s
represents a movement toward the principle of ruling whenever feasible.
The Commissioner has, by deletions from the list, expressed his willingness
to rule in areas which have heretofore been considered factual, such as
whether an amount paid to an employee is a gift or compensation; determination of earnings and profits available for distribution of dividends
to shareholders; year of inclusion in income of amounts realized pursuant
to deferred income arrangements; qualification of corporations for treatment as "Western Hemisphere trade corporations" " or section 931 corporations. 70 Most important, the statements issued by the Service preparatory to the publication of the new list manifest the Commissioner's awareness of the impact of a refusal to rule, the importance of the rulings program to sound tax administration, and his desire to subject his policies to
continuing scrutiny.7 1
F. The Basis of a Principled Progranm--Full Disclosure
has
the
the
the

It has been noted that the Service's philosophy of the no-ruling list
been to save the taxpayer time and money. 2 However, the greater
Commissioner's discretion to refuse to rule apart from the listed areas,
less the list serves this purpose. The Commissioner broadly reserves
right to "decline to rule in advance on any question whenever war-

ranted by the facts and circumstances .

.

. ." 73

Greater certainty for

the no-ruling program could be provided through an articulation by the
Service of what kinds of "facts and circumstances" will lead to the exercise
of the discretion to decline to rule. A step toward full disclosure would be
the giving of reasons to the taxpayer whose ruling request is refused.
67
"[G]etting an unfavorable ruling has some advantages too. Perhaps the proposed transaction can be revamped to meet the IRS objections. At the very least it
permits the parties to bargain with full knowledge of the possibility of tax litigation."
Yager, When and How Should the Practitioner Ask for Rulings and Technical
Advice?, 14 J. TAXATION 38 (1961).
'M1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 30, at 14.
69 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 921.
70 Compare Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 527, 528-31, with Rev. Proc.
64-31, 1964 INT. Rv. BULL. No. 30, at 15-17.
71 T.I.R. 610; see note 37 supra; text accompanying note 3 supra.
72 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
73 Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964 INT. Rxv. BuLL. No. 30, at 14.
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These reasons might then be published in the Revenue Procedure with the
addition of that area to the no-ruling list.
The Commissioner has refused to rule in some areas not appearing
on the no-ruling list. One example is the tax consequences of the installment sale of a business when payment is to be based upon profits of that
business; 74 another was whether know-how constitutes property within
section 351, upon which rulings are now issued75 The Director of the
Tax Rulings Division states: "We have not felt the necessity of public
announcement involving any such areas." 76 Besides limiting the value of
the list as a timesaver, this policy limits the usefulness of any evaluation
of the Commissioner's no-ruling program since untold areas might be
hidden from scrutiny. This suggests another important purpose which
could be served by full disclosure: to lay bare the Commissioner's policies
to the scrutiny of the tax community, which can act as a check upon the
reasonableness of those policies.
II. PRETRANSACTION REvIEw

The demise of the Warwick Fund demonstrated the devastating effect
a refusal to rule can have upon a transaction.7 7 But an adverse ruling
While
has at least as profound an effect upon a proposed transaction.
the effect of a refusal to rule arises out of uncertainty, the effect of an
adverse ruling stems from the certainty that the taxpayer will have to
litigate in order to obtain favorable tax consequences.
It is nonetheless apparent from the broad authority granted the Commissioner to issue regulations 79 that Congress intended to vest in him
the initial responsibility for interpreting the Internal Revenue Code. His
power to discourage transactions is only an indirect effect of this responsibility. But there is often no external check upon the exercise of that
responsibility when he refuses to rule or rules adversely, since the transaction may never be consummated and therefore no tax assessed. Theoretically, a misinterpretation of the Code as to the tax effects of a transaction or a genuine uncertainty of the Commissioner as to the proper
interpretation of the Code which results in his inability to rule, could
permanently suppress a transaction or class of transactions.
74

Letter From John W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, to the

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, May 1, 1964, on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
7-5 See Cohen, supra note 58, at 38.
76 Letter From John W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, to
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, May 1, 1964, on file in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
77 See text accompanying notes 24-32 supra.
78
interviews With Members of the Philadelphia Tax Bar, in Philadelphia, Feb.-

April (1964).
79 Besides the general power to issue "all needful rules and regulations," see
text accompanying note 7 supra, the Commissioner is delegated specific rule-making

powers in many individual sections of the Code. For a compilation of such sections
see Balter, Relief From Abuse of Administrative Discretion, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 176,
183 n.27(b) (1962).
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Pretransaction recourse to the courts could, in averting these results,
serve two functions: (1) a pretransaction check on the Commissioner's
exercise of discretion in ruling adversely or refusing to rule; (2) a source
of guidance for the Commissioner in areas where he is uncertain.
The Commissioner's unchecked power and his need for guidance were
both recently illustrated. The former is exemplified by the events leading
to the sad plight of the complainant in Prather v. Commissioner.s0 In
1954 he decided to change his method of accounting under the newly enacted section 481, a provision ameliorating the effects of the bunching of
income accompanying such a change 8 1 Another Code section required
the approval of the Commissioner prior to a change in accounting methods 8 2
However, the Commissioner, disapproving of the tax benefits given
under section 481, refused to give his approval to taxpayers seeking a
change in accounting method. In the words of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit: "Promptly after the August 16, 1954 enactment the
Commissioner started one of his most successful 'sitdowns' in the history
of American tax law." 8 Prather proceeded to change his accounting practices despite the failure to obtain the Commissioner's approval.8 Had he
been well counseled, he might have been discouraged from doing so. The
resulting tax consequences absent the requisite approval "about ruins
the Prathers and takes the fruits of a business they built up for over
13 years." s
The explanation for the Commissioner's "sitdown" offered by some
members of the tax bar was that he was attempting to force Congress to
modify section 481 because it contained a loophole costly to the Treasury.
The fact that the section was amended may prove either that he was right,
or that he possesses a coercive power upon Congress. In any event
Prathershows the extent of an unbridled power, one which could as easily
be exercised when to do so would be justified neither by the Internal
80 322 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1963).
81
nt. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 481(a) (2), 68A Stat. 160.
8
2INT. Rxv. CODE op' 1954, §446(e).
Such prior approval is analogous to a
favorable ruling. Several other Code sections contain similar requirements. E.g.,
§ 162 (change of bad debt reduction method), § 167 (change in depreciation methods),
§ 367 (exchanges involving foreign corporations), § 442 (change in period of accounting), § 472 (change to LIFO inventory).
83
Prather v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1963).
8
4 Id. at 932. The court further states:
One must be sympathetic with the taxpayers here, but even on a "fireside
equity" basis it can be said for the government that late in 1954 and early in
1955 it was common knowledge that the commissioner was fighting Section
481 as enacted in 1954 with everything at his command. E-is announced
policy of not approving any changes in accounting methods may have been
what prompted taxpayers to "go it alone' and unilaterally change their
accounting and reporting basis.
Id. at 935.
85Id. at 932. It should be noted that Prather acquired the opportunity to change
back to his old accounting method through the amendments to § 481 effected by
the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, ch. 866, § 29, 72 Stat. 1629, which would
have mitigated this hardship. However, Prather failed to make the required election
in time.
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Revenue Code nor by a congressional intent. Even if the taxpayer were
6
able to force a ruling in an action for mandamus, the Commissioner's
sitdown could with equal success take the form of mass adverse rulingsthat is, unless there is an avenue of pre-transaction review open to the
taxpayer.
The need of the Commissioner for guidance is exemplified by the fouryear delay in the issuance of a ruling on the question whether know-how
is property under section 351.87 Until 1960 the Commissioner ruled that
know-how was property, but then initiated a no-ruling policy to study the
issue further. In December 1961 he announced that the study had been
completed and that a ruling would be forthcoming. However, it was 1964
before any ruling was issued.88 Former Commissioner Caplin admitted
s9
that he would have welcomed judicial guidance on this question.
Court review is presently sought only after the transaction occurs
and the Commissioner attempts to tax the transaction in a given way."
But this provides neither a sufficient check on the Commissioner's ruling
powers nor a source of guidance for the Commissioner. If the adverse
ruling or refusal to rule discourages the transaction, then by definition there
cannot be posttransaction review.
Members of the tax bar who were interviewed could not conceive of
the possibility that any form of pretransaction review was either available
or had ever been contemplated, but many remembered instances when they
would have used it were it available. This Note will explore two possible
channels of review currently available-the district court and the Tax
Court-with regard both to review of an adverse ruling and to relief from
a Commissioner's refusal to rule.
86 See text accompanying notes 164-65 infra.
87 Cohen, supra note 58, at 38.

Ibid.
Interview With Former Commissioner Mortimer M. Caplin, in Washington,
D.C., March 5, 1964.
90 There are seemingly no decided cases whereby a taxpayer attempted pretransaction review of a tax ruling. Although the court in the recent case of Walsh
9491
v. Commissioner, CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (64-1 U.S. Tax Cas.)
(S.D.N.Y. March 23, 1964), viewed the complaint as one for review of an adverse
ruling, it would appear that the transaction in question had already occurred; the
court surmises that the taxpayer's intent was to state a claim under INT. Rxv. CODE
OF 1954, § 6213, which is applicable only after the taxpayer receives a notice of deficiency in tax. The United States Attorney's office for the Southern District of
New York explains the action as follows:
What happened in this case was that a tax deficiency was assessed against
John E. Walsh, Jr. and a notice of same was sent to him. After his time
to appeal the notice to the Tax Court of the United States had run, he
brought the above action in the District Court....
The adverse ruling referred to in the complaint was no doubt an assessment although as the judge indicated it was never clearly brought out. It
is also to be noted that the adverse ruling is not a revenue ruling.
Letter From Harvey R. Blau, Assistant United States Attorney, to the University
of PennsylvaniaLaw Review, Sept. 1, 1964, on file in Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania Law School. The need to clarify the Walsh case arises in part
because the Journal of Taxation reports the case for the proposition that an "IRS
ruling cannot be appealed in District Court." 21 J. TAXATION 158 (1964).
88

89
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A. Review of an Adverse Ruling in the District Courts
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
The judicial review section of the Administrative Procedure Act,
section 10,'9 1 provides the focus for any analysis of the availability of review
of agency actions. It represents an affirmative legislative policy that
"questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the
In the case of transactions which will not be
last analysis . ... .2
consummated in the face of an adverse ruling, the "last analysis" must take
the form of pretransaction review.
Section 10 grants the right of review to "any person suffering legal
wrong because of any agency action

....

,93

The act defines "agency

action" to include "the whole or part of every agency rule," u-the term
"rule" being defined as "the whole or any part of any agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 95 Since a revenue ruling is designed
to interpret the Internal Revenue Code, it qualifies as an "agency action."
The taxpayer seeking review of an adverse ruling would also have to show
a "legal wrong" within the act. The legislative understanding as to what
constitutes "legal wrong" is revealed by the House and Senate reports'
definition as constituting "such a wrong as is specified in subsection
10(e)." 96 This section includes, inter alia, "agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . (3) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations . . . . 97 Any taxpayer issued an

adverse ruling which he deems contrary to the Internal Revenue Code
could allege a legal wrong within this broad language. Thus the taxpayer
meets the basic "agency action" and "legal wrong" requirements, and
therefore is entitled to review. However, still other hurdles are planted
in the path of review both by the act and the courts.
a. Threshold Section 10 Prerequisites
Section 10 applies to all agencies except when "(1) statutes preclude
judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion." '"
9160 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
92 S. Rmp. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1946).
9360 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §1009(a) (1958).
9 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(g) (1958).
s5 60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1958).
16 S.REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1946).
9 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)
(1958).
98 60 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).

98
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As to the latter requirement, the Commissioner has the authority to
issue "all needful rules," 99 but it cannot be said that the contents of his
rulings are "by law committed to agency discretion." In another context
one court recently asserted that "rulings may not be arbitrary or unreasonable, or extend the scope or terms of a tax statute, and are entitled to no
more weight than the reasons sustaining them." "O0 However, the contention that judicial review has been precluded by statute has more force,
since Congress has acted on two occasions to insulate the Internal Revenue
Service from judicial proceedings. Section 7421 of the Code itself bars
any suit "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
" ol In addition the act authorizing the courts to render
tax . .
declaratory judgments specifically excepts tax matters. 0 2 It is further
arguable that the philosophy of the Internal Revenue Code and the scheme
of taxpayer relief therein provided preclude pretransaction review by
implication.
i. Restraint on Assessment of Tax
The manifest purpose of Congress in foreclosing suits "for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax" 103 was to
°
First, it
avoid the disruption of the orderly processes of tax collection.,Y
would not be the purpose of a pretransaction suit to accomplish such restraints; all that would be sought is relief from the hardship of having
either to proceed at one's peril or to abandon the transaction. It is true
that a pretransaction suit, if successful, would have the indirect effect of
restraining the collection or assessment of a tax upon the consummated
transaction, but such an effect is not the primary "purpose" of such a suit.
Second, in the posttransaction situation, which was the focus of section
7421 of the Code, the hardship of being forced to abandon the transaction
is not present. Paying the tax and then claiming a refund is a reasonable
alternative in light of the purported disruptive effect upon the Commissioner's processes that would otherwise occur. It is worthy of note that
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, in a study
prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, stated its belief
that pretransaction court decisions on tax matters would not affect the
Commissioner's processes of collection and assessment. 1 5 Finally, it has
been asserted that the policy of the section, even as applied to posttransaction suits, retains little vitality in light of the provision made for precollection suits in the Tax Court.?0 8
1954, § 7805 (a) ; see text accompanying note 7 supra.
oo King Trailer Co. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
101
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a).
102 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1958).
103 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a).
104 See BoRcHEAR, DEcLARATORY JUDGMENTS 850 (2d ed. 1941).
105 S.Doc. No. 10, pt 9, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1941).
1
06 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 104, at 854.
09 INT. REV. CODE OF

RULINGS
ii. Declaratory Judgment Act
The policy prompting the "tax matter" exception to the Declaratory
Judgment Act is germane to whether judicial review of pretransaction
rulings is precluded by statute. Such review could be considered to be
declaratory in the sense that the court might grant noncoercive relief in
the form of declaring the ruling to be contrary to the Internal Revenue
Code. The Declaratory Judgment Act was passed in 1934 and the "tax
matter" exception inserted in 1935.107 The legislative history accompanying this exception indicates the objections to declaratory judgments in such
matters to be the shifting of the initial consideration of questions of tax
liability from the Service to the district courts, and also, as was the
concern of the Tax Code section, the disruption of the orderly collection of
taxes.10 8 The latter objection has been shown to be of little weight as
applied to pretransaction review. The former objection also is inapplicable
because the initial consideration of tax liability in the pre-transaction
context still would rest with the Commissioner, since the basis of court
review would be his ruling.
iii. The Internal Revenue Code-The Philosophy of Taxation
Taxes levied by the Internal Revenue Code, as opposed to criminal
penalties, are not calculated to deter socially undesirable behavior, but to
finance the operations of government, redistribute income, and foster the
growth of industry by granting certain incentives. It is not the direct
intent of the Code that taxpayers should refuse to act because of unfavorable tax consequences; it is arguably more consistent with the nature of a
tax as paying one's fair share that he first act, and then government will
inform him what is due. It might seem to follow that a taxpayer should
not have a right to know the tax consequences in advance, and that since
the rulings program is the governmental concession to economic reality,
the taxpayer should have no further right to guidance from the courts.
In fact much of the economic behavior of taxpayers is not determined
according to its tax consequences. But the cases in which review should be
available are only those in which tax consequences do act as a deterrent, in
whiclf advance assurance is necessary, and in which the impact of an
adverse ruling would render it unreasonable to expect the taxpayer to
proceed at his peril. The threat of an allegedly improper tax is as worthy
of being judicially dispelled as the threat of an allegedly improper agency
regulatory order. To assert that even in such cases the taxpayer has no
right to pretransaction review since taxes are not calculated to control his
conduct is to obscure reality by a veil of fiction.
iv. The Internal Revenue Code-The Scheme of Posttransaction Relief
The Internal Revenue Code provides for civil action by taxpayers for
09
and for redetermination of a postrefund of taxes in the district court
107

See S. Doc. No. 10, pt 9, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1941).

108 Ibid.

109 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 7422.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

100

LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll3:81

assessment tax deficiency in the Tax Court." 0 It might be argued that
Congress intended this scheme of relief to be exclusive. However, by
providing for a scheme of posttransaction review, the necessity of which
is patent, does not imply that Congress affirmatively intended to preclude
pretransaction review, the need for which might not have been recognized
when these relief provisions were provided. In fact where Congress
thought it necessary to foreclose resort to the courts in tax matters, it did
so specifically in section 7421 and the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The House Judiciary Committee reporting on the Administrative
Procedure Act stated:
Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never
been the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its
own statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not
be otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank
checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or board.
To preclude judicial review under this bill a statute, if not
•.
specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear
and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it."'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that exemptions from
the review provisions will not be presumed. 1 In light of this pronouncement, the legislative policy of the act as expounded above, and the weak
policy justification for applying the two limiting statutes to pretransaction
review, the argument for statutory preclusion consists of a chain of weak
links which do not reinforce each other.
b. Form of Relief
Section 10(b) of the act provides that, in the absence of special statutory review proceedings, the form of action may be "any applicable form
of legal action (including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of
." 13 The Attorney
prohibitory or mandatory injunction . .. ) ....
General'sManual on the Administrative ProcedureAct indicates that, once
agency action is found reviewable, the court should select the appropriate
remedy." 4 The same considerations which lead to the conclusion that the
Declaratory Judgment Act exception and section 7421 of the Internal
Revenue Code do not constitute statutory preclusion of review, also lead
to the recognition of the ability of courts to select the injunctive and
110 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 6213 (a).

111 H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
112 See Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956); Kaminsky,
Judicial Review of Procedures in the Internal Revenue Service, 36
113 Administrative

TAXES

172 (1958).

Procedure Act § 10(b), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b)

(1958).
114U.S. DEP'T OF
97 (1947).
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declaratory forms of relief as appropriate ones. 115 If there is otherwise
a right to review, to conclude that there is no form in which to bring the
action would constitue a reversion to the medieval logic of the writ system.
2. Ripeness
"Ripeness" is a compendious legal conclusion, the determination of
which depends upon the weighing of a myriad of factors concerning the
posture of the case and the hardship to the plaintiff which would accom16
To say that a case is ripe
pany the nonassumption of jurisdiction."
for review may merely be another way of saying that the court is willing to
assume jurisdiction.
One relevant factor, which was made a requirement of review in the
Administrative Procedure Act for an action not rendered reviewable by
statute, is that it be a "final agency action for which there is no other
117 Davis asserts that advisory
adequate remedy in any court . .
because they are not "final
impliedly
reviewable,
not
are
opinions
that there is a flexible
indicate
decisions
court
orders." 118 However,
as well as to other
order,"
"final
of
the
concept
judicial attitude toward the
three cases which
decided
has
Court
factors of "ripeness." The Supreme
the Court were
confront
would
which
those
involved elements analogous to
ruling.
tax
it considering review of an adverse
In CBS v. United States,'" a broadcasting network challenged regulations issued by the FCC providing that broadcasting licenses would be
denied to individual stations entering into certain types of contracts with
the networks. The complaint alleged that the effect of the published policy
was to prohibit the type of agreement specified therein, and that many
stations did not want to continue with already-established contractual arrangements, because they feared the loss of their licenses. The Commission
characterized the regulations as "announcements of policy," and argued
that "the order promulgating them is no more subject to review than a
press release similarly announcing its policy." 120 The Court, in holding
that the order was reviewable, stated:
*.."

The regulations are not any the less reviewable because their
promulgation did not operate of their [sic] own force to deny or
cancel a license. It is enough that failure to comply with them
penalizes licensees, and appellants, with whom they contract. If
115 The action for review of an adverse ruling against the Commissioner can be
brought "in any judicial district in which,: (1) a defendant in the action resides,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (Supp. IV, 1963)
or . . . (4) the plaintiff resides . . . .
(venue statute for actions against any agency or officer thereof).
116 See generally Jaffe, Ripeness and Reviewable Orders in Administrative Law,
61 MicH. L. REv. 1273 (1963).

"1760 stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1009(c) (1958).

13

118 1 DAvis, ADMINisTRAT=E
STAN. L. Rxv. 307, 310 (1961).
119 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
12o Id. at 422.

LAw TREAT sE § 4.09, at 267 (1958); see Note,
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an administrative order has that effect it is reviewable and it does
not cease to be so merely because it is not certain whether the
Commission will institute proceedings to enforce the penalty incurred under its regulations for non-compliance..
It is common experience that men conform their conduct to
regulations by governmental authority so as to avoid the unpleasant legal consequences which failure to conform entails.' 2 '
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that "Congress has not
conferred upon the district courts jurisdiction over 'practical business consequences.' " 122 Apparently, he further recognized the applicability of the
Court's reasoning to revenue rulings since he stated in his dissent:
Suppose, for example, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issues a ruling that profits derived by radio stations from their
network operations are subject to a tax deemed by them to be
onerous and illegal. Could a network successfully bring suit in
equity prior to the imposition of such taxes to invalidate the ruling
on the ground that its practical consequence was the cancellation
of or refusal to renew network affiliations? One had supposed
that the answer was clearly no. But surely in principle the problem is essentially that of the cases before us.m
In Frozen Food Express v. United States,24 the ICC, after conducting
an investigation, determined that certain commodities were not "agricultural" within the Motor Carrier Act, the result being that shippers and
carriers of such products were not exempt from obtaining a certificate of
"convenience and necessity." '2 A carrier failing to obtain a certificate
when the statute so directs risks an order to cease and desist from carrying
those commodities.126 The plaintiff, a motor carrier, brought an action
to enjoin use of the order and have it set aside. The district court held
that the determination of the Commission was not subject to judicial
review.' 27 The Supreme Court, noting the "immediate and practical
impact" 128 on carriers and shippers, directed the district court to adjudicate
the merits. The statements of Mr. Justice Harlan in dissent setting forth
the countervailing considerations indicates the relevance of this case to
the reviewability of an adverse tax ruling:
121 Id. at 417-18.
122

Id. at 438 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

1= Id. at 442.
vA 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
m Id. at 41.
126 Id. at 44.
127 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
128 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956).
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To be sure, the order does serve as a warning to carriers
that the Commission interprets the act in a particular way, and
it is true that courts will give the Commission's views some indeterminate weight in construing the statute..
[T]his Court should be wary of establishing a procedure
which would prematurely throw into the courts questions of
statutory construction not arising in the context of concrete facts,
and which does not bring to the courts even the benefit of final
interpretation by the agency assigned to administer the statute
. But the carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce
...
Act are in no way worse off now than they were before this order
issued; there is no greater liability or risk under the statute occasioned by the order, which has no more effect than would any
other informal expression of views by the Commission. If anything, carriers are in a better position, since they can now make
a more reasoned judgment as to the applicability of the statute
as to particular commodities, and this may have been the principal
reason for the Commission making public its findings. m

The same considerations might be advanced as rendering undesirable a
review of any adverse tax ruling, but eight members of the Court in Frozen
Food did not find them persuasive in a related context.
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.13 ° was an action challenging
an FCC order amending its rules concerning multiple televison station
ownership. The order announced that ownership of more than five stations
constituted a concentration of control inconsistent with the public interest
such that licenses for further stations would not be granted to a multiple
owner. The Court, after raising the issue of reviewability on its own
initiative, held the order to be a final agency action within the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court quoted with approval the reasoning
of the CBS case, and asserted: "The Rules now operate to control the
[It] cannot cogently plan its present
business affairs of Storer. . .
or future operations." 131 Thus, as in the other two cases, the Court took
cognizance of the hardship visited upon one planning his business affairs
who must proceed at his peril, in the face of agency rules and regulations
that attach unfavorable consequences to that course of behavior. The
Court concluded in all three cases that this fact warranted the assumption
of jurisdiction despite the desirability of deciding the issues raised upon
presentation of the concrete facts of a consummated transaction.
The radio network and individual stations contemplating a new contract, the carrier desirous of transporting certain agricultural commodities,
129 Id. at 47-48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

130 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
131 Id. at 199-200.
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and the broadcasting company planning to obtain control of an additional
television station were in no more precarious a planning posture than the
taxpayer who has been given an adverse ruling that renders prohibitive
the tax upon a proposed corporate acquisition or reorganization. The fact
that a tax ruling may be addressed to a particular individual rather than
being of general application does not necessarily weaken the case for
review, and in fact the likelihood of agency action against the complainant
is enhanced since it is alerted to the transaction. Moreover, the taxpayer who solicits a ruling should not be held to assume the risk of
statutory misinterpretation any more than does one who seeks a court's
declaratory judgment.
3. The Declaratory Order-A Statutory Analogy
In the Administrative Procedure Act Congress has provided for the
issuance of orders which, like rulings, can be issued before application of
the law by an agency to a concrete set of historical facts. Section 5 (d) of
the act provides that "the agency is authorized in its sound discretion,
with like effect as in the case of other orders, to issue a declaratory order
to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty." 12 It is clear from
the legislative history of the act that these orders were to be judicially
reviewable,'33 which is a reason for providing that they have "like effect
as in the case of other orders." Like declaratory orders, tax rulings are
issued to "remove uncertainty," and two bills that would have specifically
excepted tax matters from the scope of 5 (d) failed to pass 134 for unknown
reasons.
The impediment to labelling a tax ruling a "declaratory order" is
the introductory clause of section 5 of the act which limits the application
of this section to cases "required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing [and matters that are not] . .
subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de novo in any
court .

," 135

It is only in such cases that agencies are authorized to

issue declaratory orders under section 5(d).136 The placement of the
provision authorizing declaratory orders within section 5 has been criticized
137
by scholars because of the limitation thereby imposed upon its use,' and
Davis specifically lamented that "this . . . apparently has the effect of

preventing the Act from conferring a needed declaratory-order power
upon the Internal Revenue Service

...

"

138

132 60 Stat 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1958).

H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1946); see S. REP. No. 752,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1945).
(Gwynne Bill); H.R. 184,
134 H.R. 2602, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(c) (1945)
79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404 (1945) (Celler Bill).
13 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
136 See S. Ra,. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1945).
137 See 1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 118, § 4.09, at 272; JAFFE & NATHANSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 408 (2d ed. 1961) ; Goldner, Declaratory Actions, 2 CATHOLIc
133

U.L. REv. 1, 8 (1952) ; Note, 13 STAN. L. REv. 307 (1961).
138 1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 118, § 4.09, at 272-73.
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The fact remains that the policy of the act prescribing reviewability
for declaratory orders is applicable as well to other agency rulings of a
similar nature. The Supreme Court seemed to recognize this analogy in
the Frozen Food case, since it characterized the ICC order as being "in
substance a declaratory one," citing section 5(d),139 despite the fact that
the order did not comply with the statutory "hearing" and "record" requirements. 140 The Court apparently considered these introductory clauses
to be immaterial for review purposes. Therefore, while the declaratory
order section of the Administrative Procedure Act is not directly applicable
to revenue rulings, it is relevant to the question of the reviewability of these
rulings in several respects. The similarity of declaratory orders to revenue
rulings and the clear policy of reviewability for the former are pursuasive
reasons for the reviewability of the latter. Also, by considering a revenue
ruling to be a declaratory order "in substance," a court can avail itself of
a concrete statutory mold in which to rest assumption of jurisdiction.
4. Judicial Self-Limitation
Given the minimum "legal wrong" requirement for reviewability,
courts must still exercise such self-limitation that they do not become overburdened, while at the same time preserving jurisdiction in the most worthy
cases. Borchard, "father of the Declaratory Judgment Act," 141 suggested
the possibility of review of tax rulings in the district courts by a certiorari
procedure, limiting review to "cases in which the bona fides of the transaction and the imminence and public importance or widespread application
of the facts require a final decision before consummation of a questioned
transaction." 142 However, a formal certiorari procedure is not necessary
to enable the courts to consider such factors. The vague and flexible
requirement of "ripeness," which is defined by Professor Jaffe as entailing
a "balancing of certain typical and relevant factors for and against the
assumption of jurisdiction," 143 provides a built-in certiorari device.
In addition courts can choose to hear only those cases in which they
consider review necessary to avert irreparable hardship. In Frozen Food,
CBS, and Storer, the Court stressed the hardship that would be visited
upon the plaintiff if review were not granted before application by the
agency of its rules.144
139 Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956).

140 There was no adjudicatory proceeding whatsoever but only public hearings at
which various governmental agencies and officials and various shippers and carriers
presented evidence. Plaintiff was not a party to these proceedings. Id. at 41-42; see
Mullen, Should Broader Use Be Made of Declaratory Findings and Orders Under
the Administrative Procedure Actf, 24 ICC PRAc. J. 156, 158 (1956).
141 Gellhorn, Declaratory Rulings by Federal Agencies, 221 Annals 153, 154
(1942).
14 2
BORCHARD, Op. cit. supra note 104, at 922. Borchard also suggests the possibility that the Tax Court or a special administrative tribunal could take such cases.
Id. at 922.
143 Jaffe, mipra note 116, at 1275.
14 See text accompanying notes 119-31.
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The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an overrefined technique, but in the need of the review to protect from
the irreparable injury threatened in the exceptional case by
administrative rulings which attach legal consequences to action
taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may
145
follow, the results of which the regulations purport to control.
The test for hardship should relate to the impact of the ruling upon the
proposed transaction. Factors relevant to this determination are the
substantiality of the tax, the availability to the taxpayer of alternative
forms of the same transaction, and the number of taxpayers whose potential
tax status is directly determined by the ruling. If the taxpayer appears
to be justified in his reluctance to proceed without knowledge of the tax
consequences, the court might then weigh the effect on the taxpayer of
not proceeding with the transaction.
Sufficient injury to warrant judicial review would certainly be present
when the pending transaction is one for which a favorable pretransaction
ruling or some form of the Commissioner's approval is a sine qua non of
146
favorable tax consequences, and the amount of tax involved is substantial.
B. Declaratory Review in the Tax Court
The Tax Court is often conceived of as being a court rather than
an agency,14 7 and if so, it would not come within the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act, and section 5(d), authorizing the issuance of declaratory
orders, 148 could not be invoked. However, section 7441 of the Internal
Revenue Code states that "the Board of Tax Appeals shall be continued
as an independent agency in the Executive Branch of the Government,
and shall be known as the Tax Court of the United States." 14o All at1
and it has
tempts to render the Tax Court a judicial court have failed,
further been held that the Tax Court is an agency within the Administrative Procedure Act. 51 The Tax Court also satisfies the specific requirements of the introductory clause of section 5, which prove troublesome
in attempting to classify the Commissioner's rulings as declaratory
orders, 1' since it is required to hold hearings 10 and its decisions are not
subject to a trial de novo in any court.
CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942).
See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
147 See generally Gribbon, Should the Judicial Character of the Tax Court Be
Recognized?, 24 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 619 (1956).
148 The Administrative Procedure Act § 2(a), 60 Stat 237 (1948), as amended,
5 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (1958), defines the word "agency" for purposes of the act's
applicability as excluding "courts."
149 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7441.
150 For one legislative attempt that failed see H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., app. 13 (1947). See generally Gribbon, supra note 147.
151 Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 379 (6th Cir. 1947). But cf.
Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949).
152 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
153 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7458.
145
148
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The fact that a comprehensive enabling provision for Tax Court jurisdiction exists in the Revenue Code 15. would not negate the application to
it of section 5(d), since this section supplements the individual jurisdic155
tional provisions of the agencies to which it applies.
Therefore, a taxpayer receiving an adverse ruling should be able to
request a declaratory order from the Tax Court in its "sound discretion"
in order to "remove uncertainty." 156 "Sound discretion" provides the
Tax Court with a device by which it can take into account factors similar
to those suggested above in regard to district court jurisdiction, thereby
limiting its burden to the more important cases. However, if the Tax
Court follows the prevailing trend in the agencies of sparing use of the
declaratory order, 5 7 or if it refuses outright to issue them, the taxpayer
would seem to have no recourse. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC158
held that a refusal to issue a declaratory order is not a final agency action
subject to judicial review. However, the Senate Judiciary Print accompanying the Administrative Procedure Act clearly states that "private
parties object to leaving the issuance of declaratory orders to agency
discretion. However, the phrase 'sound discretion' means a reviewable
discretion and will prevent agencies from either giving improvident declaratory orders or arbitrarily withholding such orders in proper cases." 159
The Pipe Line case is therefore open to question, although it is understandable that a court would be reluctant to determine what constitutes
a "proper case" for a declaratory order.
Members of the bar who adhere to the historical suspicion, whether
justified or not, that the Tax Court represents an arm of the Commissioner,
would derive little comfort from the prospect of a ruling under section
5(d) of the act. It should be remembered, however, that declaratory
orders by the Tax Court are judicially reviewable, presumably in the
circuit courts.'1 0
E5 IxT. REv. CoDE

oF 1954, § 7442.

155 See Kaminsky, supra note 112, at 173.
156 Administrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d)

(1958).

157 See ScHWARTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 248-49
(2d ed. 1962) ; Mullen, supra note 140, at 160; Note, 13 STAN. L. Rxv. 307, 319 (1961).
158 203 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1953). Davis asserts that this case "might better have
been limited to the proposition that a court will not upset such a refusal in absence
of abuse of discretion.' 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 118, § 4.10, at 287. The 1956
Hoover Commission suggested that declaratory orders be made mandatory in all
justiciable controversies. STAsoN & COoPER, ADMINISTRATIV- TRMuNALS 518, 519
(3d ed. 1957) (Recommendation No. 44 of Hoover Task Force on Legal Services

and Procedures).
159 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print on
the Administrative Procedure Act, in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr-LEGisLATIVE
HISTORY 25 (1946).

i6o INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7482(a) vests exclusive review of Tax Court decisions in the circuit courts of appeal.
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C. Need for an Expedited Procedure
Taxpayers requesting a ruling usually want a relatively rapid answer
since transactions usually are waiting in the balance. But review procedures are woefully slow, and a delay of several years may result if a
ruling is challenged in either the district court or Tax Court and then
reviewed in the court of appeals. Therefore, if some form of expedited
procedure is not provided by the courts, this factor will discourage the
seeking of review in cases where the transaction cannot await the exigencies
of review.
D. Effect of Review of Adverse Rulings on the Rulings Program
The reaction of the Director of the Tax Rulings Division to the
1
prospect of judicial review was that it would destroy the rulings system.' 6
He suggested that review is inconsistent with the goal of more rulings since
the no-ruling list would be immeasurably lengthened. A reason advanced
for such an effect on the rulings system was the formality associated with
a reviewable as opposed to a private ruling. The Director of the Rulings
Division averred that each ruling would have to be drafted in an "air-tight"
manner, as is done for regulations, so that it could withstand judicial
scrutiny. Because this would be more time consuming than is the present
ruling preparation, the number of rulings would have to be materially
lessened. Another fear of the Revenue Service generated by the prospect
of review is that the threat thereof would be used by litigious counsel as a
bargaining point in attempting to obtain a favorable ruling. Finally, it
is feared that there would be a loss in flexibility in applying expedient
rules of thumb to individual cases.
If in fact judicial review can be obtained only at the expense of
impairing the rulings system, then the benefits to be derived from review
may not warrant the cost. As a practical matter, some increase in formality
would probably attend potential reviewability. It should be stressed, however, that review is contemplated only as a safety-valve for the exceptional
hardship cases. Also, the reviewing body would overturn the Commissioner's decision only if it were contrary to the Internal Revenue Code or,
62
This
perhaps, only if it were an unreasonable interpretation thereof.'
standard of review would furnish little leverage to concession-minded
counsel. Moreover, since it is likely that the Service presently assures
itself that its rulings, though not formally drafted, reasonably interpret the
Code, its major concern as to the need for greater formality would appear
not to be warranted to the extent indicated by the Division. If, however,
161 Interview With Harold T. Swartz, Assistant Commissioner-Technical, and
John W. S. Littleton, Director of the Tax Rulings Division, in Washington, D.C.,
March 5, 1964.
162 See generally Attorney General's Comm. on Administrative Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies (Final Report), S. Doc. No. 8, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1941).
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it does not, then review is necessary even at the cost of curtailing the number of rulings. It should be remembered that the last time the Service
curtailed advance rulings the clamor which resulted reached the ears of
Congress. 1 3
III. RE.viaw oF REFusALs To RULE
A. Federal District Court Review
The chances of succeeding in an action for mandamus or mandatory
injunction in the district court to compel the Commissioner to rule appear
to be slim. The only possible limitation upon his discretion could be
argued to lie within the language of section 7805 (a), which authorizes the
4
Apart from
Commissioner to issue "needful" rules and regulations.10
the vagueness of the term "needful," it is doubtful that the courts would
read this section as embodying any limitation upon the Commissioner's
discretion to refuse to rule, since the language is that of authorization, not
requirement. Adding further doubt to the possibility of such review is
the holding in United Pipe Line 165 that a refusal to issue a declaratory
order is not a final order susceptible to review. A last hurdle is the historical reluctance of the courts to issue writs of mandamus in discretionary
1
areas. 66
B. Tax Court Order
Relief in the Tax Court would take a different form from that which
would pertain to district court review. The taxpayer could ask for a
declaratory order under section 5(d) of the Administrative Procedure
Act,167 the effect of which is not to compel the Commissioner to rule, but
for the Tax Court itself to rule upon the issue and thereby "remove
uncertainty."
Such relief would rest within the "sound discretion" of the Tax Court,
and it could therefore establish guidelines such as: the Commissioner must
first refuse to rule; the taxpayer must show cause why the Commissioner's
refusal was arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise an abuse of discretion;
and the taxpayer must prove the imminence and bona fides of the transaction and the hardship that would result if taxability were not determined
in advance. Such standards would leave primary discretion as to need for
and feasibility of ruling with the Commissioner, a fact of which the Tax
1 8s
Court might want assurance before stepping into the breach.
163 See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
164 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
165 United Pipe Line v. FPC, 203 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1953) ; see text accompanying
note 158 supra.
166 See generally Davis, Mandatory Relief From Administrative Action in the
Federal Courts, 22 U. CHI. L. Rzv. 585 (1955).
167 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(d) (1958).
183 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
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A case may arise where the Commissioner's refusal to rule results
from his own need for guidance, as was true on the issue of whether knowhow constituted property within section 351.119 In such a dilemma it
would be beneficial for the Commissioner to join with interested taxpayers
in seeking a declaratory order from the Tax Court to "remove uncertainty." 170
IV.

CONCLUSION

Not every factor which courts consider can be discussed within the
framework of a statutory or legal standard. Behind a court's decision
whether to assume jurisdiction will also be several unarticulated factors,
such as its evaluation of its own competence to comprehend complex tax
matters and, in particular, its confidence in the expertise and integrity
of the agency. The case presented for review raises a close enough question that courts could refuse to accept jurisdiction on the basis of such
factors without appearing wholly unjustified within articulated statutory
and legal standards. Therefore, the more confidence the public and the
courts retain in the integrity of the rulings program, the less likely it is
that the arguments for review will be honored. Such arguments are nonetheless important even if to be held in abeyance for such a case when the
courts will deem it timely to invoke them. If nothing else, this possibility
in itself acts as a check on the abuse of the power residing in the Service
through the rulings program.
Stephen M. Goodman
169 See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra.
17

o Administrative Procedure Act § 5(d), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1004(d)

(1958).

